I’ll support him if he wins the NDP leadership, but the consolidation of leftish Canadian support around Jagmeet Singh on the basis of that (actually pretty weird and troubling?) viral video speaks to the #1 problem with what passes for the left in Canada: a tendency to privilege heartwarming optics and performances of virtue over coherently expressed visions of social transformation. That video, at very best, is pure Trudeau. At worst it’s a progressive man literally shouting over a right-wing woman with kitchy slogans, which is the right’s stereotype of how the left deals with its critics among so-called ordinary people.
I worry that Niki Ashton doesn’t have the union and other elite NDP backing to win the leadership, but in a match-up with Trudeau she’s electable because she represents a distinct alternative, a different way of saying and perhaps of doing politics. Angus and Caron maybe less so, on the surface, but at the last debate they spoke with an assurance and a nuanced take on the issues that I found less marked in Singh, who seemed more often to speak in generalities (i.e. generalities I found less subtle and precise than the others’ generalities).
His policy positions seem to be better than Trudeau’s, so, again, if he wins the leadership I’ll support him, but if he wins it’ll also increase my fear that the modern NDP, rather than representing a genuine left alternative in Canada, instead colludes in producing the depressive state that Mark Fisher called capitalist realism: the sense that there *is* no thinkable left alternative, that all that exists is market logic and less or more woke, less or more cheerful technocratic modifications to it.
A few thoughts about fascism and class — some of them probably obvious to any theory-steeped Marxists in my orbit, but maybe useful for anybody working through these questions as I am?
Liberalism’s major analytic deficit is that its understanding of class is profoundly inadequate. Liberals don’t deny class, in fact; liberalism has a class analysis. But this analysis takes class to be a simple binary tension between rich and poor, haves and have-nots. It presumes that class is just one form of privilege, like race or ability, and if anything rather simpler than those.
The problem with this analysis is that class isn’t only or mostly about money, about having and not having, though this can be an important part of it. Class is a whole subjective and objective formation, comprised of values, tastes, modes of association, etc., and defined ultimately by its members’ roles in the process of production. The petty bourgeoisie is not the proletariat, which is also not the peasantry. All may be “poor” (or not), but their class interests are wildly different.
Fascism’s traditional base, and that of authoritarian dictatorship in general, is the petty bourgeoisie (those “small business owners”!) and the peasantry. This is Trump’s base. The proletariat or “working class,” which Marx and Engels and Lenin and Luxemburg considered to be the revolutionary class, is distinct from these groups. It’s distinguished from them by the far greater degree of association among its members. The proletariat is that group of workers exploited most directly, most bodily by industrial capitalism — but industrial capitalism brings those workers physically into community with each other, and depends on their uninterrupted labour, and so creates the conditions of possibility for them to unite against it, first of all in the form of the labour strike.
It’s this group, to repeat, that Marx et al. saw as the base for socialism.
But what happens to this class analysis when an ever greater part of capitalism is post-industrial? When the factory no longer brings the workers together, but instead they remain atomized in their diffuse digitized workplaces? How do we then distinguish between white-collar proletarians (if that can be thought) and white-collar petty bourgeois? To what extent does the proletarian class, as Marx understood it, disappear with the rise of so-called immaterial labour?
A nation of clerks, where the clerks are relatively poor, isn’t thereby a proletarian nation. It’s a petty bourgeois nation. And such workers, by nature liberal democrats if not turned fascist (the same people contain both potentials!), lack the leverage to derail capital that associated industrial workers have or had in the form of the strike.
The petty bourgeois can strike, but in their fragmentation, their isolation, to do so causes minimal disruption to capital. In the eyes of capital, they’re dispensable in a way that industrial workers became but once were not. Thus they lack revolutionary capacity, though they may act briefly with a semblance of unity to install a strongman who can represent their interests by proxy. (This is a version of Marx’s class analysis in the “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.”)
The new working class, today’s proletarians, seem to me to be mostly not in offices but behind counters and grills and steering wheels: low-wage service workers. This isn’t Trump’s base. This is a group that feels its exploitation as such, that doesn’t believe itself to be “temporarily embarrassed millionaires,” actual or potential “small business owners” in need only of lower taxes and smaller government for their success.
It’s these people who must be brought into effective coalition with the left. They, and the unemployed and disabled, late capitalism’s wounded veterans, its human sacrifice zones. And if the petty bourgeois can be won over, that’s good too. But it should be remembered that their class interests are served, to a great extent, by a leader like Trump. Which is why liberal class analysis, which de-centers and simplifies class conflict, is so often in fact petty bourgeois class analysis, the ploy of a class that wants to obscure its own parasitic relationship to authoritarian state power. Which is why we should reject it.
Happy Labour Day.
Woke liberals and alt-right trolls share a particular basket of noxious tactics. As Liza Featherstone notes in The Baffler, militants of both camps often “dox” their enemies — publish a target’s personal details to expose that person to suffering — and go after those enemies’ jobs. Such practices are ethically murky at best, it should be but isn’t needless to say. Their compatibility with the alt-right’s frank Nietzschean repudiation of morality is telling, and they’re McCarthyite through and through: the state persecution of communists during the days of the House Un-American Activities Committee was also waged primarily by attacks on people’s livelihoods, as Featherstone points out. Today’s liberals sometimes minimize the seriousness of that economic violence, deny that it is in fact violent; in a striking number of cases, those same folks tend to be insulated from any such potential privations by thick wads of family cash.
But wait! An acceptable villain, a legitimate target of doxxing and stalking and harassment, poison-pen letters to bosses and college administrators, has appeared on the scene! Behold, resurrected from that one bit of history everyone can be trusted actually to have heard of, descended from the blood-slicked frames of a Tarantino film: the Nazi! The white supremacist violence in Charlottesville presented progressives with names and faces dazzlingly permissible to hate. We must not “tolerate the intolerant,” etc. We should embrace a “diversity of tactics,” including doxxing spiteful idiots. Who could disagree? They’re actual, literal Nazis.
Well, yes, but a funny thing about Nazis: though they affirm an ideology that sites the source of group belonging in the blood, nothing in their blood makes them Nazis. An implicitly identitarian idea of the fascist — one that sees The Fash as a thing some marginal monsters are, instead of a thing many ordinary people (and states!) to various extents and rather often do — is inaccurate, ahistorical, and counterproductive in ways that matter. Not only does it reproduce the same kind of essentialism that’s in play when white supremacists assert their own natural racial difference, but it also sweeps from view the paths by which young people (especially) become indoctrinated by the far right. And it abjures completely the project of deprogramming and incorporating the winnable among them into an actually emancipatory movement.
To build such a movement means, inevitably, to recruit those whose current politics are in many aspects reprehensible. The belief that a successful, broad-based left can be composed exclusively of people who today identify as leftists or liberals is false. Just ask Lenin: “The task devolving on Communists is to convince the backward elements, to work among them, and not to fence ourselves off from them with artificial and childishly ‘Left’ slogans.” In his pleasingly titled 1920 pamphlet “‘Left-Wing’ Communism: an Infantile Disorder,” Lenin reminds us that to build socialism, we work not with “abstract human material,” but rather with the broken, wounded, dissipated “human material bequeathed to us by capitalism.” With patience and perseverance, we must wage a ideological campaign not just on but also in “those institutions, societies and associations—even the most reactionary—in which proletarian or semi-proletarian masses are to be found.” This isn’t to deny the need to rebuff physical violence by actually existing fascists with an answering defensive violence. Probably that’s sometimes necessary; to my mind, it needs to be judged case-by-case. But besides being an ineffectual distraction, throwing random punches at Nazis doesn’t go nearly far enough: we should destroy the Nazi in the man, but we also can and have to save the man. This won’t always be possible, but wherever it is possible, it’s necessary.
If we want to take practical steps to build socialism and not just indulge a counter-revolutionary politics of catharsis, we should pay close attention to the narratives of former fascists and neo-Nazis who managed to get out. Some of the people in the grip of those ideologies may be lost to hate, but others are kids grasping for belonging, solidarity, and purpose in an atomized society that’s left them half-crippled with despair. It’s easy to understand the urge to dox these people, to get them driven from college or fired, but not only do such tactics do nothing to repair the underlying causes of radicalization (and sometimes result in horrifying cases of mistaken identity), but they also signal that our movement knows only the will to retaliate when confronted with those who are or have been in sin. They communicate this not just to the Nazis themselves but also to the many, many more people observing the melee, potential converts to either side. Rather than wish suffering on those flirting with toxic politics, because they deserve it — it’s something deeper than “both sides”-ism to say we all fucking deserve it — our movement should meet them on the day after the day after their worst mistake and show them the way home. An alternative account of reality, an alternative politics, an open hand and an open door. In the Jewish tradition this process is called T’shuvah, and is honoured. The word is translated often as repentance. More precisely, it means return.
If you think this Pollyannaish, recall that the presumption in advance that certain people are irredeemable underwrites the prison-industrial complex — gotta defend against those “super-predators” — and all the police and other state-sanctioned brutality that goes with it.
Reject fascism, not just fascists.
A Facebook friend asked what I mean when I talk about the inadequacy of the “privilege” discourse, and it was a good chance to organize my thoughts. Here’s a few.
1) “Privilege,” as a liberal discourse, uses the language of intersectionality but is in fact incredibly *non*-intersectional, centering only a very few forms of difference and erasing subtler others.
2) It participates in a call-out culture that is excommunicative, guilt- and shame-fetishizing, toxic, silencing, morally compromising, and not edifying for either its winners or its losers.
3) It makes politics confessional and gestural, about becoming virtuous by confessing one’s primordial sin, rather than foregrounding the need to organize concretely and strategically across identity lines, in solidarity, to which performative self-flagellation is simply irrelevant.
4) Symbolically, it implies that everybody should be brought down to a certain level rather than everybody brought up.
5) It is distinctly alienating when directed at people who, rightly or wrongly, feel themselves not to be privileged. It loses them. It drives them into the arms of reaction.
6) It accentuates what makes us different rather than what unites us. (And it falsifies what makes us different too: see point 1.)
Excellent further reading on this includes Phoebe Maltz Bovy’s book The Perils of Privilege (https://us.macmillan.com/…/phoebemaltzbovy/9781250091208) and virtually anything the Chicago-based organizer RL Stephens II writes, including his brilliant critique of Ta-Nehisi Coates (https://www.viewpointmag.com/…/the-birthmark-of-damnation-…/). See also this great Dead Pundits podcast episode featuring the indispensable Adolph Reed Jr. (https://soundcloud.com/…/ep-22-race-class-and-dsa-w-adolph-…).
Hi, I have a question. Maybe you understand this issue better than I do and can help me out.
The classic conservative and liberal objection to socialism is that its proposals are unrealistic. This objection is generally correct, though not for the reasons its defenders claim. Socialist proposals for ending poverty, e.g., are entirely realistic given the material resources and technological powers available to humankind in 2017. They’re often entirely unrealistic, in a single country, given the relations of domination that marble the all-ensnaring web of global capitalism. This is the lesson of Mitterand’s Socialist Party in 1980s France and Allende’s presidency in 1970s Chile, as I understand it. Socialism In One Country comes under impossible pressure from militarized, mobilized capital and does not last. At best (and there are also a lot of “at worsts”), it becomes Social-Democratic State Capitalism In One Country.
So what do we do? How do we organize, as people (if we’re such people) who think capitalism chokes our highest human capacities and should be repealed and replaced? Locally, sure, on issues that matter to local people in material terms — but does that work ever become more than reformist accommodation to a vicious system? Maybe that’s the best we can do? But that’s no more than one half of a dialectic of despair, isn’t it, to win real, meaningful improvements in people’s lives while the oceans rise and apocalyptic wars are kindled by the dynamics of a system that our parliamentary inch-gains hardly touch.
I probably just need to read more Trotsky and Luxemburg or something, but like, do you think about this? What’s the way forward, the way out? How do you combat this particular despair?
One thing that living in the US has confirmed for me is that the liberal-left/socialist-left distinction is much, much clearer here than it is in Canada. I think this is partly because American (neo)liberals are often apologists for injustices that are less grotesquely in evidence in Canada: Canadian health care is already single-payer, Canadian criminal justice and carceral policy is somewhat less dystopian than its American counterpart, Canadian urban poverty can be less visible than the vast blight here. Canadian neoliberalism can more credibly, if meretriciously, claim to be an egalitarian success.
The liberal-socialist distinction is also harder to parse in Canada, I think, because of a Canadian aversion to group antagonisms, a sense that the country is small, so are its elite professional enclaves, and it’s best if we all just get along. Everyone wants to be invited to everyone else’s parties. Without many clearly articulated group antagonisms in place, with most social hydraulics converging toward consensus, the cost of individual dissent can be high: either your opinion will be more or less assimilated to the consensus or you’ll be kicked out of the club. Whereas in the US, in the same position, you’re more likely to have a pack of comrades ranged beside you and another pack at your throat.
Wherever this false amity of Canadian neoliberals and leftists is found, it’s the neolibs who tend to set the agenda, because–though they conceal it, sometimes even from themselves–they’re backed by capital. But politically, in this moment, they can’t win. Aimed at securing the participation of a more diverse range of the population in what’s inherently a brutal, exploitative system, Canadian neoliberalism offers no positive vision of a desirable life in a society organized on just principles. It doesn’t really know what to do with desire at all, except to shame it as it fans it or sublimate it in tech startups. It doesn’t know what to do with its historic guilt, except attempt in vain to exorcise it through moral panics, periodic public orgies of virtuous feeling that leave the structural causes of injustice intact. It’s neurotic and sclerotic. Joyless. A scold.
It can’t win. In this moment, it cannot build a broad enough base of support. Against the insurgent populist right, it has no chance. And if Canada is to become the just society it purports to be, or even to hold on to its political achievements, its socialist left will need to distinguish itself from the woke, elite-oriented, performatively self-righteous neoliberal “left” with which much of the Canadian public conflates it. A Canadian left that can win will seek to repair social misery, but it isn’t woke. On the contrary, it’s deep dream–in which the imagination is unshackled from staid notions of what’s possible, what kind of collective subject Canadians might be, who we are when we say “We” and how we can best enable each other’s flourishing.